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Abstract
Today, tracking and controlling the spread of a virus is a cru-
cial need for almost all countries. Doing this early would
save millions of lives and help countries keep a stable econ-
omy. The easiest way to control the spread of a virus is to
immediately inform the individuals who recently had close
contact with the diagnosed patients. However, to achieve this,
a centralized authority (e.g., a health authority) needs detailed
location information from both healthy individuals and diag-
nosed patients. Thus, such an approach, although beneficial
to control the spread of a virus, results in serious privacy con-
cerns, and hence privacy-preserving solutions are required
to solve this problem. Previous works on this topic either (i)
compromise privacy (especially privacy of diagnosed patients)
to have better efficiency or (ii) provide unscalable solutions.
In this work, we propose a technique based on private set inter-
section between physical contact histories of individuals (that
are recorded using smart phones) and a centralized database
(run by a health authority) that keeps the identities of the
positive diagnosed patients for the disease. Proposed solution
protects the location privacy of both healthy individuals and
diagnosed patients and it guarantees that the identities of the
diagnosed patients remain hidden from other individuals. No-
tably, proposed scheme allows individuals to receive warning
messages indicating their previous contacts with a positive
diagnosed patient. Such warning messages will help them
realize the risk and isolate themselves from other people. We
make sure that the warning messages are only observed by the
corresponding individuals and not by the health authority. We
also implement the proposed scheme and show its efficiency
and scalability via simulations.
1 Introduction
A pandemic, which typically occurs due to uncontrollable
spread of a virus, is a major threat for the mankind. It may
have serious consequences including people losing their lives
and economical devastation for countries. To decrease the
severity of such consequences, it is crucial for countries to
track the spread of a virus before it becomes widespread.
Main threat during such a spread is the individuals that had
close contact with the carriers of the disease (i.e., people car-
rying the virus before they are diagnosed with the disease or
before they start showing symptoms). Thus, it is very benefi-
cial to identify and warn individuals that were in close contact
with a carrier right after the carrier is diagnosed. If a country
can identify who had close contact with the already diagnosed
patients, by sending warnings to its citizens and telling them
to self-quarantine themselves, the spread of the virus can be
easily controlled. By doing so, individuals that receive such
warnings (that they had close contact with one or more diag-
nosed patients) can take self-measures immediately. This is
also economically preferred instead of completely shutting
down a country.
However, implementing such an approach is not trivial due
to privacy reasons. First of all, due to patient confidential-
ity, identities of diagnosed patients cannot be shared with
other individuals. Similarly, healthy individuals do not want
to share sensitive information about themselves (e.g., their
whereabouts) with the authorities of the country.
In this work, we propose a privacy-preserving technique
that allows individuals receive warnings if they have been in
close proximity of diagnosed patients in the past few weeks
(that is determined based on the incubation period of the
virus). We propose keeping the (physical) contact histories of
individuals by using communication protocols in their smart
phones. These contact histories are then used to determine if
an individual was in close contact with a diagnosed patient in
the past few weeks, and if so, the individual receives a warning.
In order to do this in a privacy-preserving way, the proposed
system uses private set intersection on the background as
the cryptographic building block (between the local contact
histories of the individuals and database keeping the identities
of the diagnosed patients).
The proposed scheme guarantees that (i) identities or the
whereabouts of the diagnosed patients are not revealed to any
other individuals, (ii) contact histories of the individuals are
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not shared with any other parties, (iii) warning received by
an individual (saying that they were in close proximity of a
diagnosed patient) is only observed by the corresponding in-
dividual and no one else, and (iv) the individual that receives
a warning can anonymously share their demographics with
the healthcare officials only if they want to. Furthermore, we
also propose an extension of the proposed scheme against
malicious individuals that may try to temper their local con-
tact histories in order to learn the diagnosis of some target
individuals. We also implement and evaluate the proposed
technique to show its efficiency and practicality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next
section, we summarize the related work. In Section 3, we
provide brief background about the cryptographic building
blocks we use in this paper. In Section 4, we describe the
proposed solution in detail. In Section 5, we implement and
evaluate the proposed scheme. In Section 6, we provide an
extension of the proposed scheme and discuss its potential
other uses. Finally, in Section 7, we conclude the paper.
2 Related Work
The importance of outbreak and disease surveillance (without
considering the privacy) has been studied by many previous
works [2, 3]. Some countries prefer cell phone tracking-based
systems (for diagnosed patients) in order to warn other indi-
viduals about the locations of diagnosed patients. However,
such systems compromise privacy of individuals to track the
spread of a virus [13].
[4] provides a study of existing contact tracing mobile
apps for COVID-19 in terms of their privacy considerations.
Authors show that none of the existing apps and none of
the existing schemes (except for private messaging systems)
can protect privacy of diagnosed patients and other exposed
individuals at the same time. However, private messaging
systems (in which, a diagnosed patient anonymously sends
messages to its previous physical contacts) lack scalability
and they heavily rely on proxy servers to obfuscate the identify
of the diagnosed patient.
Many apps, including [10–12] track individuals’ location
and save it in a local database. However, such an approach
compromises location privacy of diagnosed patient since in
these approaches, such information is gathered by the health
authorities. In [10–12], aggregate location paths (of diagnosed
patients) are sent to the individuals and individual gets notifi-
cation if they were in close proximity of a diagnosed patient.
This results in another privacy vulnerability since individuals
can observe the paths of diagnosed patients. Even though
only the aggregate location paths are shared by the app, if
the number of diagnosed patients is few in a given area, this
may result in a significant privacy leak for the whereabouts
of diagnosed individuals. As opposed to these approaches, in
this work, we propose a scheme that protects the privacy of
diagnosed individuals as well as the healthy ones.
3 Background
Here, we briefly introduce the cryptographic building blocks
we use in this paper.
3.1 Private Set Intersection Cardinality (PSI-
CA)
Private set intersection cardinality (PSI-CA) aims to compute
the cardinality of the intersection of two sets belonging to two
parties without disclosing either set to the other party [5]. At
the end of the protocol between the client and server, the client
learns only the size of the intersection. The only information
that is leaked to the respective parties is the upper bounds
for the size of the client and server’s inputs. We provide the
details of the PSI-CA algorithm within the proposed protocol
(in Section 4.4).
3.2 Authorized Private Set Intersection
(APSI)
Similar to PSI-CA, authorized private set intersection (APSI)
also aims to compute the intersection of two sets (belonging
to two parties) in a privacy-preserving way [6]. Different
from PSI-CA, APSI requires the authorization of the client
input first. Thus, client input is signed by a mutually trusted
authority and client also provides these signatures as the input
of the algorithm. We provide the details of the APSI algorithm
when we introduce an extension of the proposed algorithm
against a malicious individual that may temper with their local
contact history (in Section 6).
4 Proposed Solution
In this section, we first introduce our system and threat models
and then, we describe the proposed solution in detail.
4.1 System and Threat Models
The proposed system includes healthy (or not yet diagnosed)
individuals with smart phones, diagnosed patients for the dis-
ease, and a health authority (e.g., ministry of health or NIH).
Individuals interact with the database of the health authority.
In the following, we will describe the proposed scheme as-
suming a single database for the health authority. For the sake
of generality, one can also assume multiple local databases
for the health authority (e.g., located in different geographical
regions).
The health authority keeps the identities of the diagnosed
patients and it does not want this information to be learnt
by other parties. Individuals keep their local (physical) con-
tact histories in their smart phones and they do not want this
information to be observed by other parties (including the
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health authority). Also, when an individual receives a warn-
ing about a contact with a diagnosed patient, the individual
wants to make sure that no other party can observe this warn-
ing. We consider a semi-honest attacker model for the parties
that involve in the protocol. That is, each party in the sys-
tem follows the protocol honestly but they may be curious
to learn sensitive information of the other parties. On the
other hand, individuals may try to learn the identities of di-
agnosed patients or the health authority may try to learn the
contact histories of the individuals. As we will discuss in de-
tail later, the proposed algorithm protects the parties against
these threats. Finally, we assume all communications between
parties (between smart phones of two individuals or between
an individual and the database of the health authority) are
encrypted, and hence robust against eavesdroppers.
4.2 Keeping the Contact History at Local De-
vices
Each individual keeps a vector in their local smart phone for
their physical contact history. When an individual A spends
some amount of time within close proximity of an individual
B, their phone records the ID of person B. For IDs of the
individuals, we propose using the hash of their IMEI or phone
numbers. To measure the proximity between the individuals,
we propose using the Bluetooth signals on their devices. Thus,
to add individual A as a contact, B needs to spend at least t
seconds within r radius of A. This process is also illustrated
in Figure 1. As a result of this interaction, the new record in
the contact history of A is the ID of B. Each individual may
also separately keep the time and the duration of the contact
(to have more insight about their risk, as will be discussed
later).
x y z a b c
Alice Bob
Alice’s contact history Bob’s contact history
To add as a contact:
Bob spends at least 
t seconds within r 
radius of Alice
Figure 1: Keeping and updating local contact histories of the
individuals.
It has been shown that the strengths of Bluetooth signals
can be used to approximate the distance between two de-
vices [8, 14]. Alternatively, one can also use (i) just the Blue-
tooth coverage (e.g., when two devices are in the range of
each other for more than t seconds, they can update their local
contact histories with each others’ IDs), (ii) GPS informa-
tion (when two devices are within their Bluetooth coverage,
they can exchange GPS information to measure their distance
more accurately and update their local contacts if they spend
more than t seconds within a close range of each other), or
(iii) NFC signal coverage (when the devices are within NFC
signal coverage of each other, which is about 3 feet maximum,
for more than t seconds, they can update their local contact
histories with each others’ IDs). Since this part is not the
main contribution of the paper, we do not go into the details
of establishing the contact histories.
It is important to make sure that an individual cannot add a
contact in their contact list aiming to learn whether a target
person has positive diagnosis or not. For instance, knowing
the IMEI number of a target person, an attacker may construct
its local contact list only from the ID of that target, and hence
learn the diagnosis of the target. To prevent such an attack, we
consider two options: (i) make sure the local contact histories
of individuals are stored in such a way that data cannot be
accessed or modified by the individuals (e.g., local contact
history can be encrypted in the device by the key of the health
authority or contact history can be stored in a storage for
which the individual does not have read/write permission).
Or, (ii) each new contact B of an individual A also includes
a digital signature that is signed by a centralized authority
(e.g., the telecom operator). To do so, if individuals A and
B spend a certain amount of time within close proximity of
each other (measured as discussed before), they both send the
contact request to the operator, the operator signs and sends
back the signed contact record to both parties, and each party
keeps the contact records and the corresponding signature
together. This way, an attacker cannot fake new contacts in
its local contact history. The validity of these signatures are
then verified when the local contact history of an individual is
compared with the diagnosed patients in the health authority’s
database (we discuss this in detail in Section 6).
Using either of these techniques, the developed algorithm
makes sure that contact history cannot be tempered with by
the individual. Note that if the storage of the local contact
list would be an overhead, it is also possible to store the
local contacts of an individual at a cloud server (encrypted by
individual’s key) and update the local contacts periodically.
4.3 Keeping the IDs of Diagnosed Patients at
a Centralized Database
When an individual is diagnosed (e.g., by a hospital) with
the disease, the ID (hash of IMEI or phone number) of the
positive diagnosed patient is stored in the database of the
health authority (e.g., ministry of health), as shown in Figure 2.
It is important to note that only the hospital and the health
authority know the ID of the diagnosed individual.
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Alice diagnosed 
positive for the disease
Alice’s ID is stored by 
the database 
Figure 2: Updating the database of health authority with the
IDs of the diagnosed patients.
4.4 Private Set Intersection to Identify the In-
dividuals at Risk
The application on an individual’s smart phone sends queries
to the health authority’s database following a random sched-
ule. This schedule can be determined by the system to avoid
an overload to the database. It is also important not to allow
the individual to send queries at any time in order to control
the system’s bandwidth.
An individual A uses their contact history to query the
database of the health authority and the goal is to identify
whether there is an intersection between the local contact
history of the individual and the IDs of the diagnosed patients
in the authority’s database (as shown in Figure 3). Size of
this intersection reveals the number of diagnosed people with
whom A had been in close proximity in the previous a few
weeks. As the size of the intersection increases, the risk of
individual A being infected also increases. The proposed al-
gorithm provides the result of this intersection to individual
A as a warning message. Using the warning, the individual
may take early precautions (e.g., have a test or quarantine
themselves).
a b c
Bob
Bob’s contact history
Bob queries the database
Bob learns if he has contact 
with any diagnosed patients
Figure 3: Privacy-preserving interaction between an individ-
ual and the database of the health authority.
To compute this intersection in a privacy-preserving way,
we use the private set intersection cardinality (PSI-CA) proto-
col, in which parties that are involved in the protocol obfuscate
their inputs (sensitive information) and compute the result
of this intersection. Eventually, only individual A learns the
result of the intersection and the health authority does not
learn any information about the contact history of individual
A or the result of the intersection. We also make sure that in-
dividual A does not learn anything about the database content
of the health authority (e.g., IDs of diagnosed patients). We
provide the details of this protocol in the following.
Figure 4 illustrates the details of the proposed PSI-CA
based protocol between an individual (client) and the health
authority (server). As input to the protocol, client has its lo-
cal contact list and server has the list of positive diagnosed
patients (steps c.1 and s.1 in the figure).
Client masks its input with the random exponent R
′
c and
obtains the list of ai-s and computes X = gRc (X is similar to
an ElGamal public key). Client sends the list of ai values and
X to the server (step c.2 in the figure).
Server permutes its input list and applies H(.) on the list
(step s.2 in the figure). Server masks ai values with its random
exponent R
′
s, shuffles the resulting list, and computes Y = g
Rs ,
which is a public-key like value (step s.3 in the figure). Server
creates the list of ts j-s by applying the one-way function H(.)
over the multiplication of XRs and exponentiation of hs j-s to
random value R
′
s (step s.4 in the figure). Server sends shuffled
and masked ai values, Y , and ts j-s to the client.
As the last step, client does the matching between the list
of ts j-s that it received from the server and its own list of
tci-s (step c.4 in the figure). tci-s are obtained by applying the
one-way function H(.) over the multiplication of YRs and the
shuffled ai-s, which are stripped of the random value R
′
c (step
c.3 in the figure). At the end of the protocol, client only learns
the cardinality of the intersection. At step c.5 in the figure, a
notification is generated based on the output of PSI-CA.
Client (Individual) Server (Health Authority)
s.1 Input: the list of diagnosed patients

s.2   ; with    random
( ̂s1, . . . , ̂sw) ← Π(S) Π
 X, {ai, . . . , av}
s.3 Shuffle the set received from client:

s.4 Apply one-way function    using   :
H′ ( . ) X
 Y, {a′ l1, . . . , a′ lv}
 {ts1, . . . , tsw}
c.1 Input: the list of contacts   

c.2 Masking the elements in set C:

C = {c1, . . . , cv}
 
 
hci = H(ci);
ai = (hci)R
′ 
c
c.3    

  

 

    

c.4 Computes the cardinality of the intersection    

      Output:   

c.5 Generates a notification based on the cardinality
∀i 1 ≤ i ≤ v :
|{ts1, . . . , tsw} ∩ {tc1, . . . , tcv} |
 bci = (YRc)(a′ l1)1/R′ c mod q
 tci = H′  (bci)
 ∀i 1 ≤ i ≤ v :
   
    
 
Rc ← ℤq,R′ c ← ℤq
X = gRc
∀i 1 ≤ i ≤ v :
 S = {s1, . . . , sw}
permutation

   ∀j 1 ≤ j ≤ w : hsj = H( ̂sj)
   
  

   
 
Rs ← ℤq,R′  s ← ℤq
Y = gRs
∀i 1 ≤ i ≤ v : a′  i = (ai)R
′ 
s
(a′ l1, . . . , a′  lv) = Π(a′  1, . . . , a′ v)
  

 
∀j 1 ≤ j ≤ w : bsj = XRs . (hsj)R
′ 
s
∀j 1 ≤ j ≤ w : tsj = H′ (bsj)
Figure 4: Details of the PSI-CA based protocol between an
individual (client) and the health authority (server).
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4.5 Further Steps to Track the Spread
Once an individual receives a warning as a result of the pro-
posed algorithm, they can choose to (i) provide (anonymous)
information back to the health authority to help the authority
to track the spread and/or (ii) share their local contact history
with the health authority to get further information about their
risk.
In (i), the individual shares their demographics, the size
of intersection they obtain as a result of the proposed algo-
rithm, and their location with the health authority. Using such
information received from different individuals, the health
authority can have a clear idea about how the virus spreads
in the population. In (ii), the health authority, using the local
contact history of the individual and further details about the
contacts of individual (duration and location of each contact),
can provide a more detailed risk information to the individual
(e.g., if the duration of the contact with a diagnosed patient is
long, then the risk of individual also increases). As discussed
before, such contact details (i.e., duration or location) are not
used in the proposed privacy-preserving algorithm; they can
be collected and kept by the individual and may be shared
with the health authority to get more insight about the risk.
5 Evaluation
We implemented and evaluated the proposed privacy-
preserving search algorithm. We ran our experiments on ma-
cOS High Sierra, 2.3 GHz Intel Core i5, 8GB RAM, and
256GB hard disk. We used MD5 as the hash function to hash
the IMEI numbers of individuals in the local contact lists and
in the health authority’s database. We used the implementa-
tion of PSI-CA in [5], in which q and p are 160 and 1024
bits, respectively. We ran each experiment for 20 times and
reported the average.
We show the results of the evaluation in Tables 1 and 2.
In Table 1, we set the size of client’s local contact list to
1,000 and vary the size of server’s database. In Table 2, we
set the size of server’s database to 100,000 and vary the size
of client’s local contact list. Our results show that the online
phase of the protocol can be efficiently completed by the par-
ties even when the input sizes of both party are significantly
large. Note that the server does not need to run the offline part
of the algorithm for each client separately. Instead, the server
can use the same offline computation during its interaction
with every client. Also, a client can conduct its offline steps
as it generates its local contact list.
Security and correctness of the proposed algorithm depends
on the security and correctness of the original PSI-CA algo-
rithm. Thus, we refer to [5] for the security and correctness
of the proposed algorithm.
6 Discussion
In this section, we first discuss an extension of the proposed
algorithm, in which we prevent a malicious individual from
modifying their local contact history. Then, we discuss about
potential additional features of the proposed technique.
6.1 APSI-Based Protocol Against a Malicious
Individual
As discussed, a malicious individual may temper with their
local contact history to learn the diagnosis of some target indi-
viduals. To prevent this, one option is to record each contact
along with a corresponding digital signature from a central-
ized authority, such as the telecom operator (as discussed in
Section 4.2). Here, we describe how such signatures can be
used when computing the intersection between the individual
and the health authority’s database.
For this, we propose using the authorized private set in-
tersection (APSI) protocol, in which the entries in the local
contact history of an individual are digitally signed by a cen-
tralized authority and the validity of these signatures are veri-
fied by the health authority during the protocol. We discuss
the details of this APSI-based protocol in the following.
Figure 5 illustrates the details of APSI-based protocol be-
tween an individual (client) and the health authority (server) in
the semi-honest setting. First, a common input (N,e,g,H,H ′)
is determined for the protocol. N = pq is the RSA modulus,
where p and q are safe primes. e is the public exponent. g is a
random element in Z∗N . Also, H and H ′ are the hash functions,
modeled as random oracles. All computations are done in
mod N. Both server and the client have the same input sets
as in PSI-CA protocol. In addition to these sets, client also
has a list of RSA signatures (σi)-s, where σi =H(ci)d mod N
(steps c.1 and s.1 in the figure).
As an offline step, server permutes its input list and masks
its input. For this, the server first applies the function H(.)
over the list of its input elements and exponentiates each ele-
ment with randomness 2Rs. Then, hash function H ′ is applied
to the list to obtain ts j values (step s.2 in the figure). These
values are then sent to the client.
As an online step, client masks σi-s by multiplying them
with gRc:i , where Rc:i is the randomness (step c.2 in the figure).
Client sends the resulting list that contains ai values to the
server.
At server’s online step, server computes Y = g2eRs . Server
exponentiates ai values with 2eRs and obtains the list of a
′
i-s
(step s.3 in the figure). Server sends Y and a
′
i-s to the client.
At the last step, client obtains the tci values by applying
the function H ′(.) over the product of a′i and Y−Rc:i . In order
to get the size of the intersection, client finds the matches
between the lists of ts j-s and tci-s (step c.3 in the figure). At
step c.4, a notification is generated based on the output of
APSI.
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Table 1: Offline and online run-times (in milliseconds) at the client (individual) and server (health authority) with varying size
for server’s database. Size of client’s contact list is set to 1,000.
Size of server’s database Offline Time (ms) Online Time (ms)
1,000 Client: 210.6 Client: 100.85Server: 388.05 Server: 107.5
10,000 Client: 201.2 Client: 978.7Server: 2213.5 Server: 1003.8
100,000 Client: 202.95 Client: 9766.1Server: 20054.1 Server: 9925.6
1,000,000 Client: 202.4 Client: 96685.8Server: 194289.6 Server: 98631.1
Table 2: Offline and online run-times (in milliseconds) at the client (individual) and server (health authority) with varying size
for client’s local contact list. Size of server’s database is set to 100,000.
Size of client’s contact list Offline Time (ms) Online Time (ms)
10 Client: 2.7 Client: 9852.95Server: 20012.75 Server: 9560.8
100 Client: 22.6 Client: 9854.2Server: 20218.1 Server: 9968.65
1,000 Client: 202.3 Client: 9817.5Server: 20448 Server: 9979.75
10,000 Client: 1990.4 Client: 9787.45Server: 20246.45 Server: 9970.65
Based on the evaluation results reported in [1], when the
database size of the health authority is around 3 million and
the local contact history of the individual is 6: (i) the offline
part of the protocol takes around 200 minutes for the health
authority (and in our protocol, this part can be done once for
all the individuals) and offline time for an individual takes
negligible time, (ii) online part of the protocol takes around 2
milliseconds both for the health authority and the individual,
(iii) computation cost of the online part scales linearly with
the size of the individual’s local contact history, and (iv) com-
munication costs for the individual and the health authority
are around 750B and 4GB, respectively. It is worth noting that
the communication cost of the individual scales linearly with
the size of the individual’s local contact history and the health
authority can send the same message to all individuals (it does
not need to send a separate 4GB data to each individual, and
hence the communication cost of the health authority can be
optimized).
6.2 Additional Features of the Proposed Tech-
nique
The proposed technique can also be used to provide real-time
whereabouts of diagnosed individuals. Having this informa-
tion, healthy individuals would know which locations to stay
away at any given time. In fact, such an approach has been
used by some countries during the recent Coronavirus disease
pandemic [9]. However, we believe such a usage of the system
may cause social chaos and it may also result in deanonymiza-
tion of diagnosed patients’ identities (even if the information
is shared in a differentially-private way [7]). Therefore, we
prefer not to include this functionality in the proposed system.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a privacy-preserving tech-
nique to control the spread of a virus in a population. The pro-
posed technique is based on private set intersection between
physical contact histories of individuals (that are recorded us-
ing smart phones) and a centralized database (run by a health
authority) that keeps the identities of the positive diagnosed
patients for the disease. We have shown that individuals can
receive warning messages indicating their previous contacts
with a positive diagnosed patient as a result of the proposed
technique. While doing so, neither of the parties that involve in
the protocol obtain any sensitive information about each other.
We believe that the proposed scheme can efficiently help coun-
tries control the spread of a virus in a privacy-preserving way,
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Client (Individual) Server (Health Authority)
s.1 Input: the list of diagnosed patients 
 S = {s1, . . . , sw}
 {ai, . . . , av}
s3. Online

  

 
Y = g2eRs
∀i 1 ≤ i ≤ v, a′  i = (ai)2eRs
 Y, {a′ 1, . . . , a′  v}
 {ts1, . . . , tsw}
c.1 Input:    where   is  the        
list of contacts and 
   is 
the RSA-signature on client item.

(C,Cσ) C = {c1, . . . , cv}
Cσ = {σ1, . . . , σv}(∀i, σi = H(ci)d mod N )
c.2 Online

  

 
∀i 1 ≤ i ≤ v, Rc:i ← [1..⌊ N /2⌋]
∀i 1 ≤ i ≤ v, ai = σi . gRc:i
[Common input: ](N, e, g,H,H′ )
s2. Offline 

  ; with    random 
permutation

  

  

 
( ̂s1, . . . , ̂sw) ← Π(S) Π
Rs ← [1..⌊ N /2⌋]
∀j 1 ≤ j ≤ w : ksj = H( ̂sj)2Rs
∀j 1 ≤ j ≤ w : tsj = H′ (ksj)
c.3  

Output:   

c4. Generates a notification based on the 
cardinality
∀i 1 ≤ i ≤ v, tci = H′ (a′  i .Y−Rc:i)
{ci |ci ϵ C and tci ϵ {ts1, . . . , tsw}}
Figure 5: Details of the APSI based protocol between an
individual (client) and the health authority (server).
without violating privacy of their citizens.
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